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Current neuropsychological understanding of consciousness as
influenced by antecedent arguments in the philosophy of mind
Jeff Kerr
The purpose of this paper is to describe antecedent influences of philosophy on
modern neuropsychological conceptions of consciousness. I will first describe a brief
philosophical history of consciousness in the form of several famous arguments, which
underlie modern understanding of the phenomenon. As a result, I will illustrate how
modern neuroscientific theories of consciousness are very much a melody of multidisciplinary historical ideas, which play notable roles in directing neuroscience
investigation.
The very early theories of consciousness were almost exclusively philosophical
in nature. The most explicit of these early philosophies are those that viewed the mind
from a dualistic perspective, which considered mind and body as separate entities that
were not necessarily physically connected. The most famous of these philosophies is
found within Descartes’ 2nd mediation written in the 15th century, entitled “Cartesian
Dualism” (1). Specifically, his argument stated that the only aspect of humanness one
can be certain of is that of his or her own mind. In essence, because I know that I think
(I can hear my consciousness), this is the only aspect of myself I can be certain exists.
As a result, I cannot be so certain about the existence of my body. Thus, they must be
fundamentally different in some way (1). Later, he elaborates on this premise, stating
that the mind exists in some nonphysical realm, outside of reality, due to the private
nature of our thoughts. The body, however, exists in physical space, because my
material essence is necessarily public (1).
It was not until the early 20th century until philosophers began conceiving of
mental properties as physical events with respect to fundamental laws of physics.
Philosophers David Armstrong and W.T. Stace directed the philosophy of mind towards
this goal. Both are considered naturalists; a school of thought which claims that
“nonphysical events” (those supposedly incapable of being explained by
epistemological methods) have no place in scientific investigation (4). In the 1950’s,
Stace and Armstrong proposed the mind-brain identity theory, proposing that mental
properties are identical to physical properties. For example, mental events such as pain
must have some corresponding physical cause, such as neural activity or cell
physiology (2). Therefore, for every mental state, there is a physical state of the brain.
Moreover, rather than pain causing neurons to fire or neurons causing the sensation of
pain, pain is both those neurons and the sensation responsible for pain. To exemplify
this, tissue damage occurs (input), causing “pain neurons” to fire, which subsequently
causes the physical expression of pain, like crying (output). Because functionalists view
mental processing as result of qualitative cause-and-effect, with mental states defined
by their respective causal role, many philosophers and computer scientists view this
processing analogous to the methods of computers (1). With series and series of
algorithms resembling complex neural networks, this led to debate over the possibility of
artificial intelligence.
As a whole, each of these philosophies discussed above can be interpreted in
terms of modern problems in neuroscience. Even the dualist perspective of Descartes
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can be used to analyze the qualitative effects of phantom limb. For example, phantom
limb pain is experienced at a location that does not exist (where the limb used to be) (2).
In effect, it is convenient to assume that such pain exists in some nonphysical space. Of
course, the dualistic perspective is widely dismissed in the scientific community due to
its emphasis on nonphysical entities, and advances in modern neurobiology.
Nevertheless, functions of consciousness can be defined psychologically as well, in
which researchers search for the neurophysiological functions that define them (5).
However, the capabilities of modern neuroscience has also allowed for the analysis of
consciousness in reverse fashion – the ability to stimulate neurons in a variety of ways
to analyze their behavioral result.
Nevertheless, currently, there still exists great philosophical debate over how to
describe consciousness in both the scientific and philosophical realm. However,
philosophers are beginning to incorporate neuroscientific advances into the formation of
philosophies of science and mind. For instance, the modern theory of emergence
explains that higher level functioning must be a result of the processes of its makeup. In
other words, consciousness is a “higher level” or systemic brain function that only
emerges through the complex interaction of “lower level” parts, like neurons, atoms and
molecules (5). In effect, consciousness emerges from these lower level processes,
which, themselves, do not possess consciousness. Under this perspective, thought
formation should be able to be studied both from a bottom-up and top-down analysis.
Furthermore, only recently has science considered consciousness as suitable for
scientific investigation. Due to its subjective nature and first-person “ontology”, it has
been difficult to designate it as a function analogous to digestion or metabolism (6). To
consider the investigation of consciousness via scientific methods, we must allow that
consciousness to be defined by brain functioning, and is, in a sense, an “organ of the
brain” (3). Moreover, consciousness can be defined as, at a minimum, the awareness of
certain sensory processes, motor initiation and control, control over some physiological
states, and cognition (7). One of the most important developments in explaining
consciousness are split-brain studies, in which the corpus callosum, the structure
separating the left and right hemispheres, was leisoned as a treatment for epilepsy. This
effectively separated the communication between hemispheres, revealing startling
results. The effects of these studies revealed the presence of “double
consciousnesses”, with the right hemisphere possessing a different consciousness than
the left (3). Moreover, different hemispheres seemed to contribute different aspects to
consciousness; the non-dominant hemisphere dealt more with synthesizing information
and controlling appropriate social behavior whereas the dominant hemisphere
controlled discrimination and general awareness (3).
Furthermore, possibly the most famous of split-brain studies was conducted by
H.W. Sperry in 1982. He concluded that each hemisphere seemed to behave
independently of one another, with each possessing its own perceptions, learning, and
memory experiences (8,9). For instance, a split-brain patient may be going about their
daily business when their left hand spontaneously rises to pick an article of clothing
from the closet while attention was focused on an unrelated piece of clothing. This
suggests that a full awareness or consciousness is necessitated by the interconnection
of hemispheres. In other words, when a patient’s corpus callosum is severed, the two
hemispheres communicate imperfectly, resulting in an imperfect consciousness (6).
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Moreover, the integration of innumerable neural pathways in consciousness is
analogous to the visual system. For instance, in vision, anatomically different neurons
are responsible for different functions, such as angle, color, length, etc. Each of these is
integrated through a systematic network to produce perceptual experience (6)
In effect, the field of philosophy has for centuries attempted to tackle the issue of
consciousness, due to its puzzling nature and first-person subjectivity. However,
problems arose when trying to describe it through the use of scientific methodologies.
Because conscious states only exist when they are personally experienced, it is awfully
difficult to investigate its processes in an objective manner. However, as philosophical
accounts of consciousness progressed in time, they began to incorporate and remain
open to neuroscientific explanation, like modeling neural networks through
supercomputers and neuropsychological explanations of split-brain studies. As a result,
modern neuroscience appears ready to tackle consciousness as a biological
occurrence, with a make-up of electrical, cellular, and physical processes. Yet the lens
through which we view consciousness, theoretically, as an entity, has been crafted by
centuries of philosophical debate. In effect, despite advances in neuroscientific
instrumentation, like fMRI imaging that popularly will “read your thoughts”, scientists and
philosophers alike have not quite settled on an explanation of consciousness. Only until
this is settled, that we may realize the biological basis, psychological function, and
evolutionary importance of consciousness itself.
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